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Theories in the modern age in philosophy, as well as in the discourse of the social 
sciences, are pervaded with the presuppositions of the dualisms of mind and 
world, theory and practice, private and public. These theoretical dualisms make 
it impossible to have an account of the interconnected nature of the experi-
ence of individuals and societies. The philosophical theoretical vocabulary to take 
account of the relations between these dualisms has been effaced with the legacy 
of Cartesian dualism. I argue that through a conceptual analysis of the body, as 
has been posited by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the related concepts of habit, 
custom and labour, we can reclaim some concepts that allow a mediation of 
these dualisms. In this article, I make a conceptual analysis of the epistemic, meta-
physical and social–political interrelations between these concepts and argue for 
the relational role they play in our philosophical theoretical discourse.
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The advent of modernity in western civilisation is marked by the rise of the 
positivist methodology and the presuppositions of dualism that pervade our theo-
retical discourse, whether it is mind and world, theory and practice, private and 
public or any other. The key issue is the effacement of the theoretical possibility 
of a relation between these various dualisms with the rise of the positivist 
methodology. It is in this context that I discuss the epistemic, metaphysical and 
social–political interrelations between the concepts of the body, habit, custom and 
labour. I argue that these are terms that manifest the nature of the relation between 
the human person, nature and the other/s, and it is this relation that allows us 
to mediate the dualisms that pervade our theoretical discourse and have an 
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Much of the contemporary philosophical discussion on the body rests on the 
presupposition of the Cartesian mind and world dualism that marks the onset of 
modern philosophical thought. The defining influence of this dualism has been 
such that despite all the discussion on the implications of mind-body dualism, its 
presuppositions pervade our theoretical discourse, and thereby relegate the body 
and all the concepts associated with it, such as pain, labour, habits, customs to the 
linear and mechanical cycle of cause and effect. The consequence of this is that 
we either engage with our human condition as disembodied abstract beings or 
with the body as a mechanical material entity, open to manipulation and external 
control. Theoretically, the possibility of a self/subject in dialectical relation of 
mutual interchange with the objective world is lost. In theory, either the self is 
passively determined by the world or it is completely closed in on itself and its 
solipsistic mechanisms, without the mark of an objective relation with the world. 
The theoretical possibility of the self to be in relation with the world and yet have 
volition is lost in the dualist discourse.
It is in this respect that this article seeks to articulate the key theoretical role 
played by the body with respect to habits, customs and labour, in mediating the 
relation between not only the self and the world, but also the body and the body 
politic. I argue that the mediation of these relations is not dependent merely on 
the ontological constitution of the body but on the role of reflection in negotiating 
these relations. The body is a much-discussed issue in contemporary philosophi-
cal scholarship, especially in light of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological discussion of the body provides me with a 
position where the body can be discussed as the medium between the self and 
the world. However, the objective in this article is not only to discuss the body 
as a medium or sign of the relation between self and the world and the body and 
the body politic, but also to discuss the specific role of reflection in orchestrating 
this relation, that is, the relation between the metaphysical and ontological con-
stitution of the body and the body politic and the role of epistemology in nego-
tiating this relationship. In this regard, Felix Ravaisson’s (2008) discussion of 
habit allows me to show the relation between the ontological and epistemological 
aspects of habit, which is also clarified through David Hume’s (1979) discussion 
of the epistemological role of custom and habit. It is this connection between the 
epistemic and metaphysical which is brought to bear upon the social and politi-
cal realm, in Marx’s articulation of the body in labour as a sign of the relation 
between the body and the body politic.
The Concept of the Body
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is perhaps one of the most prominent philosophers who 
locates the body as the centre of the discourse in terms of transcending the subject–
object dichotomy. His phenomenological analysis of perception in Phenomenology 
of Perception (1962), articulates the special role played by the body in perception 
and thereby also in the understanding of human knowledge. This problem of 
understanding the role of the body is located in the dualist discourse, where either 
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the material world or the world of thought is privileged over the lived embodied 
experience in the world.
Merleau-Ponty considers the body as the condition for perception. The body 
as the basis of our perspective upon the world, conditions all our experiences. 
For an object to appear into view it must conceal some other object. This is the 
very nature of an object according to him, and it is not dependent on the contin-
gent understanding of our bodily make-up (the structure of eyes, its composition 
of rods and cones). The object-horizon structure is what constitutes perspective. 
To see an object is to enter into a world where the object can be hidden behind 
something or myself, and this is what allows an object to display itself. To be able 
to distinguish and focus on an object, it must be distinguished against a horizon. 
He explains further, for instance, when we view an object we ascribe to it quali-
ties not only the ones that are visible to us but also that are ‘visible’ to other 
objects in the vicinity. Objects thus present themselves as forming a system or a 
world. The permanence and identity of an object is granted in a system or a world, 
and the object itself is the object seen from everywhere (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
pp. 67–69). The thrust of this formulation is not to hint at the conformity with 
others in terms of perception but in fact the very opposite—the uniqueness of each 
perspective, and further and more fundamentally, to articulate the metaphysical 
and ontological conditions of perception—relation of the self and the other/s in 
the constitution of an object in perception.
He further argues that the above account made in terms of the spatiality of an 
object is applicable to the temporal aspect of it as well. The present moment when 
an object is viewed is a moment in its temporal duration. Despite the changes in 
the object each moment underpins a permanent reality. Each moment calls forth 
the other moments to bear witness to the object as it is in the present, and thereby 
in a sense contains the possibility of how things will turn out. This is ensured 
through the same structure of the horizon. The present holds on to the immedi-
ate past and likewise the immediate past bears the same relation with its past. 
The impending future holds the horizon of imminence. The present will be the 
immediate past of that imminent future and thus, there is an ongoing flow of dura-
tion, where the horizon directs our gaze to the past as well as to the possible and 
imminent future (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 69).
His discussion on embodiment highlights that any object in our perception 
is constituted by us and is not naturally given. This constitution of the object is 
dependent on the condition of embodiment and the perspective that it allows us 
on to the world. This world is not a subjective personal world but a world which 
comprises and is understood against the horizon of other beings and objects exist-
ent in this world. The body then is our locus and the medium via which we interact 
and constitute the world and our worldview.
The key argument for my project is Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of the nature 
of the body, wherein it is conceived of as consisting of two layers—the habit body 
and the body at this moment. The body then is not to be apprehended only as 
revealed to us at this moment but in the light of a more general aspect and of an 
‘impersonal being’. The notion of the impersonal being is a very crucial concept 
as it is this notion that allows the transcendence of the mind and world dualist 
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options for the understanding of the body. The body need not be limited to our 
immediate experience of it and in fact despite its particularity, it is also the only 
tool that which allows us to transcend that particularity. Merleau-Ponty points 
out that under most cases we take recourse to our immediate body and personal 
existence, but at the margins of our existence there exist patterns and rhythms that 
arise out of our interactions with other human beings and the world, almost akin 
to a kind of impersonal existence, and it is this horizon which allows us to carry 
on with our lives and enclose our personal spaces within that (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 82).
Thus, there is a sort of dialectic that plays out between this personal and imper-
sonal existence. In this sense, the body serves as the pivot on which this interplay 
occurs and our existence is centred on but it also prevents it from being centred 
completely. This ambiguity is the peculiarity of the role of the body and our exist-
ence in the world. Thus, according to him the contentious union of the soul and 
the body is not something brought about by arbitrary decree but is a matter of 
enactment in every moment of existence where personal and impersonal being are 
both involved (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 89).
Habit, Custom and Labour and their Interrelations
It is this articulation of the nature of the body that allows me to take account of 
habits and customs. These patterns of interaction indicate the role of the body as 
the medium through which there is interaction between not only the self and the 
world but also the body and the body politic. The body is the site for these patterns 
of interaction to take hold whether it is personal habits or customs of the body 
politic; it is these patterns of interaction with the body as the pivotal site that 
indicate mediation between the mind and the world and also the public and the 
private.
These patterns of interaction assume repetition and repetition as a fundamental 
law, whereby it is constitutive of the basic conditions of human nature and exist-
ence. However, this repetition is not merely mechanical as is commonly held 
in the modern western philosophical tradition. Habit as a term is also generally 
considered derogatory in this discourse. This is a part of the legacy of Cartesian 
and Kantian philosophy where habit is considered merely a mechanical repetition 
stifling the reflective freedom of the mind and thereby the cause of inauthentic 
living (Malabou, 2008, p. vii). Despite the fact that David Hume calls habit or 
custom the great guide of human life (Hume, 1979, p. 44), habit as a concept of 
central philosophical importance has not received due consideration. In the last 
century only some pragmatic and continental philosophers have given the concept 
some attention, but it has not found its way into the discourse of mainstream con-
temporary philosophy. As stated, in part, this is due to the legacy of Descartes and 
Kant, but more importantly it is my contention that the legacy is due to the domi-
nance of the positivist methodology in modern western philosophy, which cannot 
account for concepts that explicate relations. Habit as a concept is what allows 
the self to mediate the relation between the immediate/personal and the imper-
sonal self, and therefore escapes articulation within modern western philosophy. 
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The crucial issue is that in the conception of habit as a relation there are always 
two sides which can be distinguished but cannot be separated and thus there is a 
dialectical interplay, the course of which is determined by the self.
David Hume, on the other hand, considers habit or custom as the great guide 
of human life. In explicating this argument, the epistemic aspect of habit is 
quite clear. It is what allows human knowledge to surpass the hold of immedi-
ate influence of the senses and memory and thereby allows us to make experi-
ence useful as a source of action in the present and for the future. The temporal 
aspect of custom or habit, where past experience is brought on to bear on present 
experience and thereby be a source of action, is what maintains continuity for the 
human being and his identity and also serves as the grounds for reflection. This is 
based on his analysis of the limits of reason and experience separately, vis-à-vis 
human knowledge. It is only under the influence of custom that together reason 
and experience are brought to bear upon and reflect on a particular situation that 
is the foundation of our most valid inferences and conclusion.1
Based on Hume’s analysis, it is clear that reflective reason by itself cannot 
account for any knowledge that we have about the world, unless there is repeated 
experience to aid our inferences. On the other hand, experience by itself cannot 
give us any necessary connection between occurrences. This relation of necessary 
connection can only be inferred and theorised on by a reliance on the principle of 
custom. Reasoning from custom allows us a position of reflection on the continu-
ity in our experiences, as the expectation in the like results from like experiences 
stems not from reason but custom and experience serving as the grounds for such 
expectation. Hume categorically states that custom is a fundamental principle of 
human nature and it is only pretence on our part when we maintain that when 
we employ custom we have not articulated an ultimate principle (Hume, 1979, 
p. 43). This principle also serves as the grounds for experiment, as custom is what 
accounts for sustaining continuity in our actions or engagements with the world. 
Without the intervention of this principle, we would be limited to our present 
memory and senses alone. The ability, therefore, to hypothesise and witness its 
affirmation in the world with an experiment is possible only by relying on custom, 
whether in the scientific realm or in the social–political.
Hume’s formulation of habit or custom covers largely its epistemic influence 
on human knowledge. However, he briefly remarks on the metaphysical basis of 
this principle as well, when he says:
[A]s this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice 
versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it 
could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its opera-
tions; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in 
every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more 
conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, 
by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may 
discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all 
the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our 
limbs without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are 
actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a 
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correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects. 
(Hume, 1979, p. 55).
In line with Hume’s indication of the metaphysical basis of the principle of 
habit, Félix Ravaisson in his seminal text, Of Habit (2008), carries out his enquiry 
into the fundamental nature and role of habit within the intersection of episte-
mology and metaphysics. Ravaisson’s articulation of habit presupposes a non-
dualistic conception of nature and the spirit as opposed to the Cartesian dualism 
of mind and the world. This conception places the will and the freedom associated 
with it at one end or at the limit of a continuum that extends to the other end of the 
deepest corners of nature;2 and habit is that middle term or the dividing line that 
constantly traverses by imperceptible degrees this continuum from the limits of 
these two extremes and enables a relationship between the two. The two ends of 
this continuum maybe conceived as contraries only in abstraction but through the 
movement of habit they actually come together.
The body, as the site of this relationship, in this discourse is not a mechanistic 
or purely material entity. It is in its very being fused and animated by the soul 
and habit is that principle or law that enables the manifestation of this relation-
ship. To clarify further, Ravaisson does differentiate between the organic and the 
inorganic realms,3 but for him nature also falls within the realm of the organic. 
Then the primary distinction between the organic and the inorganic is based on 
the difference between the actuality and potentiality of the former, which provides 
for habit to take hold in it. Also, that the inorganic resolves into homogeneity 
and is infinitely divisible whereas the organic is heterogeneous and indivisible.4 
Despite these distinctions, inorganic existence is presupposed as the condition 
of organic life and therefore the difference between the organic and inorganic is 
one of degrees and not absolute which is a crucial point in terms of the relation 
between the self and the world.
His metaphysics is similar to that of Leibniz’s, where each single unity is 
unique and has its own potentiality and this potentiality cannot be altered from 
the outside. Another important aspect of Ravaisson’s relation with Leibniz is 
his interpretation of Leibniz’s principle of inertia, which is different from the 
Newtonian articulation of the principle. According to Leibniz, each body persists 
in the sequence of changes initiated by it. Thus, inertia is not a passive state of a 
being but an active or dynamic state through which the being tries to persevere in 
its state. This law is the basis on which Ravaisson shows that habit is not devoid 
of intelligence despite the fact that it has left the sphere of the active will. The 
change is initiated by the will and habit carries on with the action, based on the 
goals set by the will even though there is no immediate consciousness of the same. 
The difference between will and nature is covered by habit in a continuous flow of 
imperceptible degrees and not in leaps. This allows Ravaisson to argue against the 
mechanistic conception of habit as well as the body, as intelligence and reflection 
do not remain confined to the disembodied thought but pervade the entire being in 
its concreteness in space and time (Carlisle & Sinclair, 2008, p. 13).
According to Ravaisson habit functions under a double law, which states that:
The continuity or the repetition of passion weakens it; the continuity or repetition of 
action exalts and strengthens it. Prolonged or repeated sensation diminishes gradually 
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and eventually fades away. Prolonged or repeated movement becomes gradually easier, 
quicker and more assured. Perception, which is linked to movement, similarly becomes 
clearer, swifter and more certain. (Ravaisson, 2008, p. 49)
This double law of habit accounts for the diminishing of sensations from a 
repeated activity on the one hand and the development of skill on the other. For 
instance, Ravaisson argues that one tends to become immune over time, even to 
the effects of the most violent poisons when regularly administered (Ravaisson, 
2008, p. 63). In the case of skill, the spontaneity and ease of action is only a 
manifestation of the will and reflection having become the very nature and flesh 
of the being. This manifestation of skill, so critically tied up with the body, can be 
witnessed in the dexterity and works of a craftsperson or an artist or a sportsper-
son and even in theoretical undertakings of a researcher.
There is a dialectic that is orchestrated by the self/soul that initiates the 
direction of habit, whether it is towards mechanical repetition or voluntary action. 
It is in the movement of the body that the will and intelligence of the being are 
manifested. Habits in this sense are signs that instantiate the relation between the 
self and the world. It is also in this context that the concept of labour takes on its 
relevance, as it not only accounts for the individual in isolation but in his relation 
with others as well as nature. The movement of the body that manifests the will 
and intelligence of the self comes on to take a clearly etched aspect in terms of 
man in his relationship with the other and the body politic in the form of the body 
in labour. Thus, the body in movement, as revealed via habit, is crucial as grounds 
to the extension of the argument that the body in labour can be conceived as the 
sign of human identity and essence.
Articulated as such, the body in labour is the site of not only the self and 
the world mediating but also the private and the public. Engels in his essay, 
The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man (1996) articulates 
the fundamental role of labour as a repeated activity that allowed for the evolu-
tion of man. He states that labour is so primary to being the basic condition for 
human existence, that it can be said that labour created man (Engels, 1996, p. 1). 
His argument rests primarily on the role of the human hand, which is not only an 
instrument of labour but also, attained its own form and dexterity via its repeated 
use over generations.5 Thus, labour as the repeated activity plays a fundamental 
role in establishing man as distinct from other animals. Engels argues for this by 
saying that no animal, however similar structurally its hand may be to man, but it 
was never able to fashion even a crude tool (Engels, 1996, p. 2). The role of repeti-
tion is significant in the development of man’s dexterity and in the development 
of his own identity in distinction from animal life. 
However, in Engels’ materialist discussion of the body and labour, the role 
played by the self and reflection is not discussed. Marx elaborates this aspect 
more clearly and comprehensively and in some distinction from Engels, when 
he states that truly human labour is not merely a means of livelihood or survival 
but in fact it is truly human when production occurs free from the bodily needs of 
man. Animals also engage in production and in that sense labour as well, however, 
the difference is that man produces not just for his own self or his species but 
taking into account all of nature, that is, he produces universally (Marx, 2009, 
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p. 32). This formulation by Marx brings into focus the significance of the self and 
knowledge into labour as an activity undertaken by man to affirm and instantiate 
his humanity as opposed to being a mere repetition or purely mechanical activ-
ity. The labour that Marx speaks of takes account of the essence of humanity and 
distinguishes humans from animals as opposed to being a repetitive movement.6
The habits of a person are not developed in isolation, but are part of his social 
nature. In the context of labour, Marx states that it reaffirms the species-being 
of man. In the context of habit formation, John Dewey (1923) states that it is 
customs that take precedence over individual habit formation as each individual is 
born into a society, which is conditioned by prior customs, and individuals accom-
modate themselves to these customs. He further states that:
Each person is born an infant, and every infant is subject from the first breath he draws 
and the first cry he utters to the attentions and demands of others. These others are not 
just persons in general with minds in general. They are beings with habits, and beings 
who upon the whole esteem the habits they have, if for no other reason than that, having 
them, their imagination is thereby limited. (Dewey, 1923, p. 58)
For an individual to share the life of a community, the customs of that com-
munity play an essential role. They are what allow an association between the 
individuals, the society and the body politic.
Custom, like habit, has been regarded as a deterrent to rational thought.7 The 
primary issue in this regard has been that customs seem to demand unconditional 
adherence and encourage conformity, thereby thwarting individual freedom and 
thought. However, this problem emerges based on a misunderstanding of the 
fundamental nature of custom. This problem presupposes a fossilised and rigid 
nature of custom. It is empirically observed that rigid customs are detrimental to 
an individual’s freedom and development; however, this is not the nature of custom 
in principle. The crucial point is that customs indicate the nature of the relation 
between the individual and the society/body politic. Customs when fossilised 
indicate an imitative or mechanical relation; however, customs when adaptable 
and living indicate the role of reflection as the basis of society. There is a dialectic 
that plays out between a private individual and the public life of a community, 
which is determined by the interaction of the habits of the individual and the 
customs of the community. Imitative following of customs by individuals (with 
specific habits) leads to stagnation of the community and thwarting of individual 
freedom, on the other hand individuals (also with specific habits) who participate 
in their tradition and customs with a reflective understanding may allow maturity 
and growth of both the community and the self. The underlying principle to this 
view is one of continuity. This world-view presupposes that changes, specifically 
in terms of the social and political sphere, do not take place in leaps. The social 
and the political sphere is so deeply embedded within the traditional and the 
circumstantial that to effect any sense of change within this realm first requires 
submission to the tradition and thereby a careful knowledge of it and only then a 
retention or improvement from within.8 This formulation lays the grounds for the 
coming together of experience and reflection in the social and political sphere, 
which further allows for the possibility of experiment within this sphere.9
Shah 197
In fact, customs as such cover almost the entire range of activities in our lives—
from the clothes we wear to how we know and understand our world. Ravaisson 
calls habit, the ‘law of grace’ (Ravaisson, 2008, p. 57), and this designation is also 
applicable to custom. Custom is the principle that prevents us from exerting away 
at each and every detail of our lives and allows us to participate in the collective 
inheritance of the community with ease.10 The validity of this principle and its 
influence in human lives presupposes interrelatedness, that is, individual exist-
ence presupposes as its very basis the existence of other beings.
Conclusion
There is a complex and continuous dialectic that plays out between the individual, 
nature and his community, each of which interact and affect each other. In the 
sense that nature provides the material conditions to which societies and individu-
als respond. It determines the limits of their customs and habits. On the other 
hand, it is also the individuals who wilfully orchestrate the direction of their 
habits, which go on to affect the community as well as nature. However, as 
Ravaisson argues that by analogy the cosmos/nature itself can be viewed as per-
vaded by a certain kind of intelligence or will. This ‘will’ is manifested in the 
regular laws of nature, in nature’s spontaneity, where the idea and the being are 
always fused together. In this way, the principle of habit pervades not only the 
human being but also the cosmos. And it is the principle of habit that enables a 
relation between the individual and the world or the microcosm and the 
macrocosm.
All these relations draw on the body as its pivotal site. It is clear that the body 
in this discourse cannot be limited to the immediate self, neither epistemically 
nor ontologically. The body is constituted and understood as the ground for 
dialectic between the personal and the impersonal in terms of man and nature 
and the private and the public in terms of the individual and the body politic. 
Metaphysically, the logical conclusion of this is that the personal or the immediate 
body is just one aspect of the self and the other aspect of the impersonal body in 
its fundamental constitution (habits and patterns of interaction) can take account 
of the deepest corners of the cosmos and in terms of the body politic, even the 
most distant member.
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Notes
 1. For examples and a detailed exposition of this position, see Hume (1979), particularly 
note pp. 43–45.
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 2. This dualism is couched in the apparent antinomy of voluntary freedom and natu-
ral necessity, and habit is the principle that allows this to be surmounted (Carlisle 
& Sinclair, 2008, p. 103). For Ravaisson, this dualism is a matter of distinction as 
opposed to separation, as he goes on to argue that the difference between the two 
realms is not absolute but a matter of degrees.
 3. The organic realm is the empire of Nature and the inorganic is the empire of Destiny 
(Ravaisson, 2008, p. 31).
 4. These distinctions are further based on the difference of organisational structure 
between organic and inorganic existence. Within inorganic existence, there is homoge-
neity and therefore little scope for habit to transform which leads to necessity. On the 
other hand, organic existence indicates heterogeneous unity within space and therefore 
a difference in actuality and potentiality, that allows for habit to transform the being 
and allows for spontaneity. For habit presupposes change, but a change that repeats 
itself and thereby acquires a certain kind of persistence. This change is not within the 
inherent potentiality, which is the limit of the change, but in the actuality. It is this per-
sistence in the actuality that manifests itself as the ground for spontaneity (Ravaisson, 
2008, p. 33). 
 5. Based on the Bible (Saint Paul, Romans, 7:23), Ravaisson also articulates habit as the 
law of the limbs (Ravaisson, 2008, p. 57).
 6. The image from Modern Times (Charlie Chaplin, 1936) comes to mind in this con-
text. The image of the tramp’s incessant tics and contorted movements while working 
in the factory is a good example to distinctly see what Marx means by alienated labour. 
In the movie, under the regime of the modern factory set-up, the tramp is as such 
labouring, but one can see the degradation of the self in such a system, which stands 
further instantiated when the tramp is sent to the mental asylum. However, true labour 
would actually be just the opposite of this conception. The form of such a labour 
would actually instantiate man’s humanity and wisdom with respect to being able to 
account for production taking account of all of nature.
 7. For a discussion on the conception of customs in modern philosophical thought, see 
Custom (Ladd, 1967).
 8. For a detailed discussion of this, see Rationalism in Politics (Oakeshott, 1991).
 9. This conclusion can be instantiated through an insight into Gandhi’s various social-
political experiments, such as with diet and Brahmacharya. Anuradha Veeravalli has 
discussed these in Gandhi in Political Theory (2014).
10. Dewey presents an analogy to explain the relevance of customs in this context. 
He says: 
  Few persons have either the energy or the wealth to build private roads to travel upon. They find 
it convenient, ‘natural’, to use the roads that are already there; while unless their private roads 
connect at some point with the high-way they cannot build them even if they would. (Dewey, 
1923, p. 59)
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